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FAMILY LAw-In re Department ofPublic We!fare, 1981 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. 1157,421 N.E.2d 28. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On May 15, 1981 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in 
an opinion written by Justice Liacos, issued a decision that reversed 
and remanded an order of the probate court which had granted a 
petition by the Department of Public Welfare to dispense with the 
need for the consent of a mother to her child's adoption. l The order 
I. In re Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1157, 1158,421 N.E.2d 28, 29. 
The petition was brought pursuant to MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 3 (West Supp. 
1982-1983) which provides: . 
§ 3. Dispensing with required consent in certain cases; child under care of 
charitable or public institution; notice of petition 
(a) Whenever a petition for adoption is filed by a person having the care 
or custody of a child, the consent of the persons named in section two, other 
than that of the child, shall not be required if: 
(i) the person to be adopted is eighteen years of age or older, or if 
(ii) the court hearing the petition finds that the allowance of the petition 
is in the best interests of the child, as defined in paragraph (c). . 
(b) The department of social services or any licensed child care agency 
may commence a proceeding, independent of a petition for adoption, in the 
probate court of Suffolk county or any other county in which said department 
or agency maintains an office, to dispense with the need for consent of any 
person named in section two to the adoption of a child in the care or custody of 
said department or agency. Notice of such proceeding shall be given to such 
person in a manner prescribed by the court. The court shall issue a decree 
dispensing with the need for said consent or notice of any petition for adoption 
of such child subsequently sponsored by said department or agency if it finds 
that the best interests of the child as defined in paragraph (c) will be served by 
said decree. Pending a hearing on the merits of a petition filed under this para­
graph, temporary custody may be awarded to the petitioner. 
(c) In determining whether the best interests of the child will be served by 
granting a petition for adoption without requiring certain consent as permitted 
under paragraph (a), the court shall consider the ability, capacity, fitness and 
readiness of the child's parents or other persons named in section two to assume 
parental responsibility and shall also consider the ability, capacity, fitness and 
readiness of the petitioners under paragraph (a) to assume such responsibilities. 
In determining whether the best interests of the child will be served by 
issuing a decree dispensing with the need of consent as permitted under para­
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by Justice Liacos remanded the case to the probate court for a deter­
mination as to the mother's current fitness to care for her child.2 The 
current state of Massachusetts law required such a finding3 and re­
quired that findings be both specific and detailed.4 Yet In re Depart­
ment ofPublic We!fare 5 [In re DPW] is important for reasons that go 
beyond the significance of the case for this mother, Brenda, and her 
child, Shari. Justice Liacos articulated a new standard for the deter­
mination as to when parental rights may be terminated.6 This new 
standard, if applied with care and discretion, can help many of the 
children of this Commonwealth who are currently in a state of limbo 
within the foster care system.7 Furthermore, this standard, if applied 
within the context of a social service system that fulfills its mandate 
to preserve family integrity,S should not encroach anymore than nec­
graph (b), the court shall consider the ability, capacity, fitness and readiness of 
the child's parents or other person named in section two of chapter two hundred 
ten to assume parental responsibility, and shall also consider the plan proposed 
by the department or other agency initiating the petition. 
If said child has been in the care of the department or a licensed child care 
agency for more than one year, in each case irrespective of incidental communi­
cations or visits from his parents or other person named in section two, irrespec­
tive of a court decree awarding custody of said child to another and 
notwithstanding the absence of a court decree ordering said parents or other 
person to pay for the support of said child there shall be a presumption that the 
best interest of the child will be served by granting a petition for adoption as 
permitted under paragraph (a) or by issuing a decree dispensing with the need 
for consent as permitted under paragraph (b). 
Id. 
2. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1179,421 N.E.2d at 40. 
3. Id. at 1178,421 N.E.2d at 39; see Bezio v. Patenaude, 381 Mass. 563, 576-78,410 
N.E.2d 1207, 1214 (1980). "[Tlhe critical question is whether the natural parents are 
currentlyfit to further the welfare and best interests of the child." Id. (emphasis added). 
4. This standard of proof was rejected by the United States Supreme Court in 
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). There, the Court, through Justice Blackmun, 
held that the higher level of clear and convincing evidence was required before parental 
rights to the care and custody of a child could be terminated. Id. at 747-48. The Massa­
chusetts courts have held that specific and detailed findings do not measure up to the 
level required by Santosky, and have ordered remands to determine whether findings 
will stand under this higher scrutiny. Custody of a Minor, 13 Mass. App. Ct. 1088, 1089, 
436 N.E.2d 172, 173 (1982), appeal denied, 386 Mass. 1105,438 N.E.2d 75 (1982). 
5. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1I57, 421 N.E.2d 28 [hereinafter cited as In re DPW1. 
6. Id. at 1175,421 N.E.2d at 38; see infra notes 31-34 and accompanying text. 
7. See generally A. GRUBER, FOSTER HOME CARE IN MASSACHUSETTS (1973). 
8. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 1 (West Supp. 1983) provides: 
§ 1. Declaration of policy: Purpose 
It is hereby declared to be the policy of this commonwealth to direct its 
efforts, first, to the strengthening and encouragement of family life for the pro­
tection and care of children; to assist and encourage the use by any family of all 
available resources to this end; and to provide substitute care of children only 
when the family itself or the resources available to the family are unable to 
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essary upon the rights of parents to the care and custody of their 
children.9 It is the purpose of this note to show how this new stan­
dard can serve the interests of both parents and, even more impor­
tantly, children. 
II. FACTS 
. When Shari was born in 1975 her mother, Brenda, was serving a 
prison sentence at the Massachusetts Correctional Institute in 
Framingham [MCIF].10 Pursuant to MASS. GEN LAWS ch. 119 
§ 23A, II Shari was accepted into the custody of the Department of 
Public Welfare and placed in the care of a foster family.12 To facili­
tate visitation, Shari had been originally placed with a foster family 
who resided near MCIF.13 Brenda, who is black, had requested that 
Shari be placed with a member of her extended family or, alterna­
tively, with a black foster family.14 Neither of these requests were 
complied with and the testimony at the hearing was conflicting re­
garding the Department's efforts to comply. IS During this incarcera­
tion Brenda and Shari had weekly visitation until April, 1976. 16 
From this point on, the contact between Brenda and Shari became 
sporadic. The visits, when they took place, went well, but they did 
not occur with any regularityP Brenda's contact with the Depart­
ment was also sporadic, although Brenda again requested that Shari 
be placed with her family.ls Again, the testimony at the hearing was 
conflicting regarding the actual effort of the Department to comply 
with Brenda's request. 19 By March, 1978, the Department had con­
cluded that Shari needed a permanent placement and, thus, obtained 
temporary legal custody of her. Shortly thereafter the Department 
provide the necessary care and protection to insure the rights of any child to 
sound health and normal physical, mental, spiritual and moral development. 
Id. 
9. See infra notes 43-50 and accompanying text for a discussion of the rights of 
parents. 
10. In re DPW, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1158,421 N.E.2d at 28. 
11. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 23A (West 1969) provides that U[a]ny child 
born to an inmate of the Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Framingham. . . shall 
be accepted by the department. ..." Id. 
12. In re DPW, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1158,421 N.E.2d at 29. 
13. Id. at 1160,421 N.E.2d at 30. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. at 1160 n.2, 421 N.E.2d at 30 n.2. 
16. Id. at 1161,421 N.E.2d at 30. 
17. Id. at 1161-63,421 N.E.2d at 30-32; see also Appellant's Brief at 50-53 app., In 
re DPW, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1157,421 N.E.2d 28. 
18. In re DPW, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1163,421 N.E.2d at 32. 
19. Id. at 1164 n.5, 421 N.E.2d at 32 n.5. 
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filed the petition to dispense with Brenda's consent to Shari's adop­
tion.20 On June 9, 1978, Shari was placed with a black foster family 
who were to become Shari's adoptive parents.21 
On April 22, 1980, the Department's petition was granted.22 On 
appeal Brenda challenged the decision on several grounds. She al­
leged that, pursuant to MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 210 § 3, the Depart­
ment did not have legal custody of Shari as the Department acted 
incorrectly when it took custody of her under ch. 119 §§ 23A and 
23C.23 Brenda next argued "that the Department violated its own 
regulations and failed to follow the statutorily declared policy of the 
Commonwealth to strengthen and encourage families."24 She fur­
ther argued that the standard of proof applied by the Common­
wealth, specific and detailed findings, was too low, and that the clear 
and convincing evidence test should be applied.25 While none of 
these arguments were successful, Brenda was successful in showing 
that the probate court did not affirmatively find her to be currently 
unfit.26 Justice Liacos made a careful and detailed survey of the 
Massachusetts case law regarding the requirement of a finding of 
parental unfitness.27 He also engaged in a comprehensive discussion 
on "the principle that a child's interest is best served in a stable, con~ 
tinuous family environment."28 He concluded that "the term 'unfit­
ness' signifies something more than a standard by which we measure 
the limits of acceptable parental conduct. The term is a standard by 
which we measure the circumstances within the family as they affect 
20. Id. at 1164, 421 N.E.2d at 32. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN ch. 119, § 23C (West. 
Supp. 1983) provides that "[t)he department may seek and shall accept on order of a 
probate court the responsibility for any child under eighteen years of age who is without 
proper guardianship due to the ... unavailability, incapacity or unfitness of the parent 
or guardian...." Id. As Brenda was not at MCIF, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119 
§ 23A (West 1969), no longer applied. 
21. In re DPW, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1164, 421 N.E.2d at 32. 
22. Id. at 1158, 421 N.E.2d at 29. 
23. Id. at 1165,421 N.E.2d at 32. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 3 (West Supp. 
1983) requires that the Department have the care or custody of child when they file the 
petition. 
24. In re DPW, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1169, 421 N.E.2d at 35; see supra note 8 
and accompanying text. 
25. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1176, 421 N.E.2d at 38. Clearly, this argument would 
have been successful today. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
26. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1179, 429 N.E.2d at 40; see supra notes 1-2 and accom­
panying text. 
27. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1171-72, 421 N.E.2d at 36. See generally Note, King 
Solomon's Couri: Reconciling the Interests ofParent, Child and State Under Mass. Gen. 
Laws ch. 119, 15 NEW ENG. L. REV. 853 (1980). 
28. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1172-73, 421 N.E.2d at 36-37. 
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the child's welfare."29 The resulting standard thus necessarily incor­
porates the concept first stated by the court in 1959 that 
When a child is placed. . . in a good family the inevitable conse­
quence will be that firm bonds of affection and confidence will 
rapidly arise on both sides. The damage to the child . . . from 
breaking these bonds is something which even competent psychia­
trists may be unable to predict. In the absence of compelling stat­
utory command, such a breach should not be permitted lightly at 
the request of either of the natural parents. . . . The interests of 
the natural parents must be completely subordinated to the per­
manent interest of the child. 30 
Justice Liacos held in In re .DPW that 
[N]atural parents may not be deprived of the custody of their mi­
nor children in the absence of a showing that they 'have grievous 
shortcomings or handicaps that would put the child's welfare in 
the family much at hazard' or 'unless some factor such as lengthy 
separation and a corresponding growth in the ties between the 
child and the prospective adoptive parents indicate[s] that the 
child would be hurt by being returned to the natural parents.'3l 
Justice Liacos ordered a remand to determine whether a reunifi­
cation of Shari with Brenda would have long-term, devastating ef­
fects. If such was determined, there would be no further visitation.32 
The intent of the standard thus becomes clear: if a child has a strong 
tie to prospective adoptive parents, and the severance of that tie 
would be harmful to that child, the natural parent is considered unfit 
to parent that child. While the court made it quite clear that it was 
not adopting a per se rule whereby prospective adoptive parents who 
are a child's psychological parent33 would automatically prevail over 
natural parents,34 the impact of the standard will have such an 
effect.35 
29. Id. at 1173-74,421 N.E.2d at 37. 
30. Id. (citing Adoption of a Minor, 338 Mass. 635, 643, 156 N.E.2d 801, 806-07 
(1959). 
31. In re DPW, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1175,421 N.E.2d at 38. 
32. Id. at 1179, 421 N.E.2d at 40. 
33. See infra notes 36-41 and accompanying text. 
34. In re DPW, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1175 n.16, 421 N.E.2d at 38 11.16. 
35. See infra notes 63-76 and accompanying text for a discussion of different stan­
dards for termination of parental rights. 
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III. ANALYSIS 
A. The Psychological Parent Doctrine 
In In re DPW the court used the term "minor child's psycholog­
ical parents" in a footnote which attempted to limit the application 
of the standard.36 The understanding of this term is important in 
order to appreciate the vast significance to a child of a standard that 
utilizes this concept. 
While the term "psychological parent" gained notoriety in 1973 
with the publication of the seminal work by Joseph Goldstein, Anna 
Freud and Albert SoInit, Beyond the Best Interests ofthe Child,37 the 
term was described in an earlier Yale Law Journal student note.38 
Psychological parentage, or bonding may be described as 
[T]he mutual interaction between adult and child, which might be 
described in such terms as love, affection, basic trust, and confi­
dence [which] is considered essential for the child's successful de­
velopment, and is the basis of what may be termed psychological 
parenthood. . . while, at birth, a biological parent's potentiality 
for establishing such a relationship may be greater, no such imbal­
ance exists after a third party has had custody for a period of time. 
After a period of separation from the biological parent and care 
by a third party, the child may learn to look upon the latter as his 
psychological parent; any prior relationship with the biological 
parent may deteriorate to the point where it is not only sup­
planted, but also incapable of resuscitation. Where this has hap­
pened, a change in custody based solely on biological 
relationships might, by disrupting the existing relationship of psy­
chological parenthood, work considerable emotional harm upon 
the child; it could even cause him to refuse to enter a new 
relationship.39 
Other commentators have also written about the concept of psy­
chological parentage. They have stressed that it is essential to the 
welfare of the child that courts consider the child's psychological re­
lationship to the adults involved in the case as paramount to their 
decision.40 Goldstein, Freud and SoInit are unequivocal in their be­
36. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1175 n.16, 421 N.E.2d at 38 n.16. 
37. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE 
CHILD (1973). [hereinafter cited as BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS). 
38. Note, Alternatives to "Parental Rights" in Child Custody Disputes Involving 
Third Parties, 73 YALE L.J. 151 (1963). 
39. Id. at 158-59. 
40. See, e.g., id. at 159 n.38 ("In the third party situation, the most frequently 
overlooked criteria of psychological significance are the preferences of the child, the im­
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lief that the disruption of this relationship is extremely painful and 
harmful to the child and it is from their work that much of the subse­
quent literature in this field stems.41 
The standard adopted by the Supreme Judicial Court in In re 
DPW, while not creating a per se rule, does in fact permit the termi­
nation of parental rights on the finding that the child will be hurt by 
removing her from the care of her psychological parents.42 If one 
accepts the theory that a child will be hurt by such a disruption, it 
becomes clear that the practical result of this standard is that the 
rights of a parent will be terminated upon a finding that the child has 
psychological ties to her caretakers. 
portance of the affections and attachment of the child toward the third party, and the 
possible effects of a disruption of this relationship."); see also Mnookin, Child-Custody 
Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face 0/ Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 226, 286 (1975) ("While the proposition has not been empirically proven, the risks 
of removing the child from a 'psychological parent' for placement with a psychological 
'stranger' would seem to outweigh the psychological benefits the child might receive by 
maintaining a better sense of lineage by living with the natural parent."); Foster & Freed, 
A Bill 0/Rights For Children, 6 FAM. L. Q. 343,350 (1972). 
It is patent nonsense to presume that the best interests fo a child will be served 
by being taken out of an adoptive home and returned to a natural mother. On 
the contrary, assuming a satisfactory mutual adjustment, it is adverse to the 
child's best psychological developmental, and physical interests to precipitously 
remove him from the security and warmth he has known and to deprive him of 
his psychological parents. 
Id.; Coleman, Standards/or termination ofParental Rights, 26 WAYNE L. REv. 315, 337 
(1980). 
Society has not established a method to assure that each child develops an af­
fection relationship. . . . These relationships cannot be doled out like food 
stamps or medical care, nor does it appear that such a development is likely in 
the foreseeable future. Therefore, the relative importance of affection relation­
ships in the child rearing system is exemplified . . . by the great weight such 
relationships are given in deciding whether to terminate parental rights. . . . 
Id. 
41. BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS supra note 37, at 31-34. Goldstein, Freud and 
Solnit define psychological parent as the relationship that: 
results from day-to-day attention to [the child's) needs for physical care, nour­
ishment, comfort, affection and stimulation. Only a parent who provides for 
these needs will build a psychological relationship to the child on the basis of 
the biological one and will become his "psychological parent" in whose care the 
child can feel valued and "wanted." 
Id.; see also Wald, State Intervention on Behatf of Neglected Children: Standards For 
Removal ofChildren From Their Homes, Monitoring the Status ofChildren in Foster Care, 
and Termination ofParental Rights, 28 STAN. L. REv. 623, 668 (1976). 
42. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1175,421 N.E.2d at 38; see supra notes 31-34 and ac­
companying text. 
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B. Rights ofParents 
The difficulty with this interpretation of the standard articulated 
in In re .DPW is that it appears to effectively truncate the legitimate 
rights of parents to the care and custody of their children.43 The 
United States Supreme Court has "by now made it clear beyond the 
need for multiple citation that a parent's desire for and right to 'the 
companionship, care, custody and management of his or her chil­
dren' is an important interest that 'undeniably warrants deference 
and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection.'''44 The 
Massachusetts courts have also recognized that the natural rights of 
parents are a " 'private realm of family life which must be afforded 
protection from unwarranted state interference.' "45 
Despite the need for children to be placed permanently with 
caretakers with whom they have a psychological attachment,46 "[t]he 
best of intentions and the greatest zeal to care for neglected, depen­
dent, or delinquent children do not justify the violation of the consti­
tutional provisions as to due process that are involved in removing a 
child from the custody of its parent.' "47 It was the interest of pro­
43. See In re Juvenile Appeal, 177 Conn. 648, 661, 420 A.2d 875, 881 (1979). "To 
the ordinary fears in placing a child in foster care should not be added the concern that 
the better the foster care custodians the greater the risk that they will assert, out of love 
and affection grown too deep, an inchoate right to adopt." Id. (citing Spence-Chapin 
Adoption Servo v. Polk, 29 N.Y.2d 196,205,274 N.E.2d 431, 436, 324 N.Y:S.2d 937, 945 
(1971). 
44. Lassiter v. Department of Social Serv., 452 U.S. 18,27 (1981) (citing Stanley v. 
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645; 651 (1972». Despite this statement of the importance of parental 
rights, the court in Lassiter held that a parent has no due process right to counsel in a 
termination proceeding but rather than such a decision should be made on a case-by-case 
basis. Id. at 31-32. In dissent, Justice Blackmun deemed parental rights "to be among 
those 'essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men' ...." Id. at 38 (Black­
mun, J., dissenting.); see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (discussing 
the "court's historical recognition that freedom of personal choice in matters of family 
life is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment."); Quil­
loin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Stanley v. 
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Pierce v. Soci­
ety of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). This liberty 
interest has even been extended, in a limited way, to foster families. See Smith v. Organ­
ization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 846 (1977). 
45. Custody of a Minor, 375 Mass. 733, 748, 379 N.E.2d 1053, 1062 (1978); see In 
re Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 376 Mass. 252, 264, 381 N.E.2d 565, 572 (1978). "Indeed, 
because the interest in family integrity is fundamental in nature, it has been held that 
certain types of official intrusion into this private realm may be justified only when fur­
thering a 'compelling state interest.''' Id.; see also Department of Pub. Welfare v. J.K.B., 
379 Mass. 1,3-4, 393 N.E.2d 406, 408 (1979) (holding that in Massachusetts, parents do 
have a due process right to counsel in termination proceedings). 
46. See supra note 41. 
47. Campbell, The Neglected Child: His and His Family's Treatment Under Massa­
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tecting this fundamental right that led to the decision in Santosky v. 
Kramer, requiring clear and convincing evidence before parents 
rights were terminated.48 The requirement in Massachusetts law 
that a parent be found currently unfit also has its basis in the sub­
stantial respect accorded family autonomy.49 
There are, however, occasions, when a natural parent does not 
give a child adequate care. It is in those situations when the state, in 
its tole as parens patriae, may step in and assume the care of that 
child.50 While the parens patriae role should be minimized, and 
when utilized done so in a way that will preserve rather than sever 
familial bonds,51 there are occasions when bonds must be severed. 
The task of preserving parental rights and protecting children be­
comes, at this point, a matter of achieving a balance between parents 
with a right and children with a need. 
C. The Balancing Process 
The Massachusetts courts have struggled to reconcile the three 
sets of competing interests; the natural rights of the parents, the 
parens patriae duty of the state and the needs of the child. 52 The 
conclusion of the courts as to which interest shall predominate is 
clear. ~'[T]he dependent child's needs are paramount, and only with 
hesitancy would we relegate those needs, in the scale of comparative 
values, to a position secondary to what the mother claims as her 
rightS."53 The Supreme Judicial Court stated in 1907 that its "first 
chusells Law and Practice and their Rights Under the Due Process Clause, 4 SUFFOLK 
U.L. REV. 631, 664 (1970) (citing In re Godden, 158 Neb. 246, 252, 63 N.W.2d 151, 156 
(1954». 
48. 455 U.S. 745 (1982). 
49. Id., at 753; see supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
50. Custody of a Minor, 377 Mass. 876, 880, 389 N.E.2d 68, 72 (1979); see also In 
re New England Home for Little Wanderers, 367 Mass. 631, 641-42, 328 N.E.2d 854, 860 
(1975). 
51. Campbell, supra note 47, at 632-38. 
52. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 776. See also Wald, State Intervention on Beha!l of "Ne­
glected" Children: A Search/or Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REv. 985, 989 (1975). 
53. Custody of a Minor, 378 Mass. 732, 743, 393 N.E.2d 836, 843 (1979); see also 
Custody of a Minor, 13 Mass. App. Ct. 290, 294 n.4, 432 N.E.2d 546, 550 n.4 (1982), 
rev'd, 13 Mass. App. Ct. 1088,436 N.E.2d 172 (1982), appeal denied, 386 Mass. 1105,438 
N.E.2d 75 (1982). 
There is no doubt that the child is a beautiful, loving alert little girl, who has 
come to love and thrive under the care of two beautiful people, [foster parents]. 
To take the child out of that environment would seem almost criminal. 
However, when one discusses the matter with the biological parents, the 
thought of denying them of the right to their child has a chilling effect. 
Id. 
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and paramount duty is to consult the welfare of the child"54 and 
went on to state in 1928 that "[t]o that governing principle every 
other public and private consideration must yield."55 The court con­
tinues to use this language today. 56 
This is not an invitation to a carte blanche approach to the ter­
mination of rights, for the difficulty persists in determining when the 
needs of the child become paramount. 57 A concept that can provide 
guidance to the courts in these instances is the notion that the rights 
of the children to be placed in permanent homes with a psychologi­
cal parent should be accorded the same constitutional protection as 
the parent's fundamental rights to the care of these children. 58 If one 
views the issue as competing sets of constitutional rights, it becomes 
easier to justify balancing one against the other. 
D. The Constitutional Rights of Children 
Although it has yet to gain legal recognition, commentators 
have suggested that children should have a fundamental right to be 
raised in a permanent home and that right be constitutionally guar­
anteed and protected.59 The Bill of Rights for Children60 states that 
A child has a moral right and should have a legal right: 
1. To receive parental love and affection, discipline and gui­
dance, and to grow to maturity in a home environment which en­
ables him to develop into a mature and responsible adult. . . . 
8. To emancipation from the parent-child relationship when that 
relationship has broken down and the child has left home due to 
abuse, neglect, serious family conflict, or other sufficient cause, 
54. In re Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 13 Mass. App. Ct. 901, 903, 429 N.E.2d 1023, 1025 
(1982). 
55. Purinton v. Jamrock, 195 Mass. 187, 199, 80 N.E. 802, 805 (1907). 
56. Richards v. Forrest, 278 Mass. 547, 553, 180 N.E. 508, 511 (1932). 
57. See, e.g, In re DPW, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at lin, 421 N.E.2d at 36. 
58. See, e.g., In re New England Home for Little Wanderers, 367 Mass. 631,641­
42,328 N.E.2d 854, 860 (1975). The court had difficulty in reaching its decision to termi­
nate the mother's rights as the parent and child had been separated for only a brief time 
when the petition was brought. Id. at 644-45, 328 N.E.2d at 862. 
59. See infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text. 
60. Musewicz, The Failure 0/Foster Care: Federal Statutory Reform and the Child's 
Rightto Permanence, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 633, 647, 650, 655, 663 (1981); see also Muench 
& Levy, Psychological Parentage: A Natural Right, 13 FAM. L. Q. 129, 129 (1979); 
It is the thesis of this article that foster children have a substantive due process 
right under the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
to be free from ill-advised state action in the determination of their psychologi­
cal parent, and that custody of the foster child should therefore go to the psy­
chological parent even when the psychological parent is the foster parent. 
Id. 
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and his best interests would be served by the termination of paren­
tal authority.61 
A judicial determination that the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States guarantees each child the right to a 
permanent placement would be a logical result from the Court's 
demonstrated awareness of this need.62 Given, however, the fact 
that it does not appear likely that the United States Supreme Court 
will articulate this new fundamental right, it remains to the individ­
ual states to determine how to best serve their children's needs and 
rights. The standard adopted by Massachusetts is a positive step to 
see that children have the right to be placed with their psychological 
parent. 
E. M ode/ Termination Standards 
Commentators in the field have argued for two different ap­
proaches to determine when parental rights should be terminated. 
Goldstein, Freud and Solnit originally advocated the use of a flex­
ible standard, one that made use of three guidelines to determine 
placement.63 The guidelines were drawn to assure that children 
would be placed with adults who were or were likely to become the 
children's psychological parents.64 To facilitate the decision were 
the following criteria: (1) that placements protect the child's need 
for continuity of relationships,65 (2) that placements consider the 
child's and not the adult's sense of time,66 and (3) that placements 
reflect the law's inability to supervise interpersonal relationships and 
its limited capacity to make long-range predictions.67 
In 1979, Goldstein, Freud and Solnit reappraised their ap­
proach to termination.68 They came to the conclusion that specific 
statutory periods were the most reliable indicators and least detri­
mental alternatives with which to give legal recognition to psycho­
61. Foster & Freed, supra note 40, at 347. 
62. Musewicz, supra note 60, at 672-73. 
63. BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 37, at 48. "The process through 
which a new child-parent status emerges is too complex and subject to too many individ­
ual variations for the law to provide a rigid timetable." Id. 
64. Id. at 31. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. at 40. "A child's sense of time is based.on the urgency of his or her instinc­
tual and emotional needs and thus differs from an adult's sense of time." Id. at 98. 
67. Id. at 49. 
68. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE 
CHILD 13-14 (1979) [hereinafter cited as BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS). 
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logical parent and child relationships.69 They believed that the 
period of time needed to decide who the child's psychological par­
ents were could result in intolerable periods of uncertainty.70 They 
thus adopted the position of the commentators who recommended a 
termination statute based on the length of time a child was in foster 
placement.71 
Commentators who advocate for the adoption of a time-in­
placement statute hope to provide a balance between the protection 
of children and the protection of parental rights.72 The termination 
statutes must be fair and workable, and must guarantee all parties 
both substantive and procedural due process.73 As the goal is to 
achieve permanence for the child, the statute must provide that the 
child will be freed for adoption after a minimum period in place­
ment if there is no real likelihood that the child will return to the 
natural home in the foreseeable future.14 Only a showing of compel­
ling reasons to the contrary should prevent the adoption.75 
69. Id. at 42. 
70. Id. at 43; see also Mnookin, supra note 40, at 218. "[F]lexible discretionary 
standards . . . will too often result in children being left in limbo for years because of 
repeated routine extensions, even though it is improbable that the child will ever go 
home." Id. at 281. 
71. Id. at 280. 
The most direct way of [knowing when to encourage development of new ties 
rather than reunification with the biological family] would be to require the 
judge at the end of a fixed period of time to proceed on the assumption that the 
child will not be returned to his natural parents and that the primary role of the 
state is to find an adoptive home or some other stable, long-term environment. 
The law should be changed to provide final termination of parental rights at the 
end of the required period if the child could not be safely returned to the home 
and if the state had made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parents while the 
child was away from home." 
Id. 
72. Musewicz, supra note 60, at 646. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. Commentators recommending the adoption of a time in placement statute 
include Mnookin, supra note 40; Musewicz, supra note 60; Coleman, supra note 40; Katz, 
Freeing Children For l'ermanenll'lacement Through a Model Act, 12 FAM. L. Q. 203 
(1978); and Wald, supra note 41. 
For a sample termination statute see INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, 
STANDARDS RELATING TO ABUSE AND NEGLECT 157-58 (Tent. Draft 1977). 
8.3 Standard for termination when child is in placement. 
A. For children who were under three at the time of placement, a court 
should order termination after the child has been in placement for six months, 
if the child cannot be returned home at that time, unless the court finds by clear 
and convincing evidence that an exception specified in Standard 8.4 applies. 
B. For a child who was over three at the time of placement, the court 
should order termination after the child has been in placement for one year if 
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The standard articulated by the Supreme Judicial Court in In re 
DPW clearly does not implement a time in placement standard for 
the termination of parental rights.76 The practical effect of the stan­
dard, however, may be the same. The important distinction is that, 
in a time-in-placement statute, there has been a legislative determi­
nation that bonding has occurred. In Massachusetts, the determina­
tion is made by the court. 
F. Protection ofParents 
It is reasonable to suggest that socially disadvantaged persons 
may fear that a time-in-placement statute, or a standard such as the 
one articulated in In re DPW, could be used against them as a means 
of permanently depriving them of their children.77 Poor people be­
come involved in the system with much greater frequency than do 
people from other classes. Often the social workers are from the 
middle class and reflect a bias that is class-based in nature.78 The 
courts, however, do not attempt to insure that each child lives in an 
the child cannot be returned home at that time, unless the court finds by clear 
and convincing evidence that an exception specified in Standard 8.4 applies. 
However, if at the six-month review hearing the court finds that the parents 
have failed to maintain contact with the child during the previous six months 
and to reasonably plan for resumption of care of the child, the court may termi­
nate parental rights unless one of the exceptions specified in Standard 8.4 ap­
plies. 
c. Whenever parental rights have been terminated under subsections A. 
and B. because the child falls within one of the exceptions, the case should be 
reviewed every six months to determine whether the exceptions continue to be 
applicable. If not, termination should be ordered. 
8.4 Situations in which termination should not be ordered. 
Even if a child comes within the provisions of Standard. . . 8.3, a court 
should not order termination if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that 
any of the following are applicable: 
A. because of the closeness of the parent-child relationship, it would be 
detrimental to the child to terminate parental rights; 
B. the child is placed with a relative who does not wish to adopt the child; 
C. because of the nature of the child's problems, the child is placed in a 
residential treatment facility, and continuation of parental rights will not 
prevent finding the child a permanent family placement if the parents cannot 
resume custody when residential care is no longer needed; 
D. the child cannot be placed permanently in a family environment and 
failure to terminate will not impair the child's opportunity for a permanent 
placement in a family setting; 
E. a child over age ten objects to termination. 
Id. 
76. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
77. Musewicz, supra note 60, at 747. 
78. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equity & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 
834 (1977). 
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ideal environment. If that were the case there would be very few 
families that would not require intervention by social services.79 
The legitimate fears of parents could be minimized if foster care 
reforms such as case management, foster care review, and pre-place­
ment preventive services were adopted.80 The foster care system 
must be designed to facilitate maintaining the parent-child relation­
ship by encouraging family reunification and visitation.8! . 
Implicit within the Massachusetts Regulations Governing the 
Department of Social Services82 is the position espoused by the com­
mentators to protect the child and safeguard family integrity. The 
regulations provide standards for substitute care,83 service plans,84 
79. 	 Wald, supra note 52, at 1037. 
80. 	 Musewicz, supra note 60, at 747. 
81. 	 Id. at 644. 
82. 	 MAss. ADMIN. CODE tit. 110, §§ 1.00-20.00 (1979). 
83. 	 Id. § 5.05. 
(1) 	 Except in an emergency, the department shall provide substitute care only 
when preventive services have failed and the family itself or the resources 
needed and provided to the family are unable to ensure the integrity of the 
family and the necessary care and protection of the child. A full range of 
preventive and supportive services shall be provided to the family which 
would enable a child to remain at home and avoid placement. 
(2) 	 Substitute care shall . . . only be provided when there is a service plan 
which. . . shall consider the following alternatives of substitute care: 
(a) 	 placement in the child's own home; 
(b) 	 placement with relatives; 
(c) 	 placement in family foster care; 
(d) 	 placement in community residential care. 
(3) 	 To the maximum extent feasible, out-of-home substitute care shall con­
form to the following requirements: 
(a) 	 it is the least restrictive setting for the child; 
(b) 	 it has the least drastic impact upon the existing family unit after pro­
viding for the needs of the child; 
(c) 	 it is in close proximity to the home of the child's family; 
(d) 	 it shares the racial, cultural and linguistic characteristics of the child's 
family; 
(e) 	 it will allow for frequent visits between child and his/her family; and 
(1) 	 it can serve as the placement for any of the child's siblings in the 
department's custody. 
Id. 
84. 	 Id. § 5.08. 
(2) 	 Any service plan which recommends out-of-home placement. . . and 
(3) 	 Shall specifically address the following placement goals: 
(a) 	 return to or reunification with the child's immediate family; 
(b) 	 return to or reunification with a member of the child's immediate 
family; 
(c) 	 adoption, where reunification is not possible; 
(d) 	 short-term family foster care which is goal-directed; 
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case review,85 procedural safeguards,86 and visitation.87 Strict adher­
(e) 	 short-term treatment in community residential care which is goal­
directed; 
(f) 	 long-term family foster care or community, residential care but only 
under extraordinary circumstances where none of the above place­
ment goals are possible; and 
(g) 	 self-sufficiency. 
Id. 
85. 	 Id. § 5.09. 
(I) 	 An initial review of all voluntary and involuntary placements in substitute 
care under sections 5.11 or 5.12 of these regulations shall occur within six 
(6) weeks of the initial placement. The initial review shall be conducted 
by the social worker assigned to the case, his/her supervisor, and the pro­
vider of substitute care. The written record of the initial review shall be 
entered into the case file. 
(2) 	 A full case review of all voluntary and involuntary placements in substi­
tute care under sections 5.11 or 5.12 of these regulations shall occur within 
three (3) months of the initial review and every three (3) months thereaf­
ter. Written findings shall be made and entered into the case record. The 
case review conference shall include the social worker, parents, any ma­
ture child and the substitute care provider. A copy of the written findings 
shall be provided to the parents and the mature child. 
Id. 
86. 	 Id. § 5.14 
The department and providers shall adhere to the following procedural 
safeguards: 
(I) 	 Notice ofIntent to Petition the courtfor Custody 
(a) 	 Except in an emergency, the department or provider shall give prior 
written notice to the parent(s) and any mature child of the intent to 
petition the court for a transfer of custody. The notice shall be given 
at least two (2) weeks in advance of the intended legal action and 
shall speciry the nature of the hearing and how counsel may be ob­
tained. The decision to petition the court for custody shall be ap­
proved by the social worker, the supervisor and an attorney licensed 
to practice law in the Commonwealth. . . . 
(2) 	 Notice ofIntent to Change Placement or Visitation 
(a) 	 Except in an emergency, the department or provider shall give 
prior written notice to the parent(s) and any mature child of any 
intended change in placement or visitation. The notice shall be 
sent two (2) weeks in advance of the intended action and shall 
contain a notice to the parties of their rights to file a grievance 
under Chapter 10.00 of these regulations. 
Id. 
87. 	 Id. § 5.15. 
Frequent and regular visits between children in substitute care and their 
parent(s) and siblings shall be used to improve and strengthen the family rela­
tionship and to prepare for the child's return to the family. 
(1) 	 Frequency of Vis,ls-Parents shall have the right to visit weekly with their 
child unless the child's physical or emotional health would be endangered. 
If so, the social worker shall document the reasons, receive the written 
approval of the area director, and include the documentation in the case 
file. In the event that parents object to the schedule of visits, they shall be 
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ence to these regulations should have the result of avoiding place­
ments from the outset, and facilitating reunification if placement 
cannot be avoided. Thus, the right of both the parents and the chil­
dren are protected. If, however, reunification is not possible, if the 
child does develop a psychological tie to the foster parents, the needs 
of the child will be met by terminating the parents' rights in accord­
ance with the standard imposed by In re .DPW. Assuming the regu­
lations were followed, the parents' fundamental rights will have been 
accorded the deep respect they deserve.88 Finally, there is case law 
that holds, in dictum, that "there may be cases in which agency ac­
tion with respect to a family has been so arbitrary and irrational as 
to warrant a dismissal of the child custody petition."89 Agencies and 
social workers should be held accountable to uphold the basic policy 
of the Massachusetts social service system.90 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Given the standard articulated by the court in In re .DPW, as­
suming that on remand the court finds that Shari will be harmed by 
informed of their right to file a grievance under Chapter 10.00 of these 
regulations. 
(2) 	 Place of Vifits-The location of visits shall be selected to provide an at­
mosphere in which parent(s) and child will be able to relate in a relaxed 
manner. The social worker shall attend visits only if a parent or child 
request his/her presence or if the need for staff presence has been estab­
lished and included in the service plan. Area offices shall not be used for 
visits unless the social worker can demonstrate that the child's physical or 
emotional health would otherwise be endangered. 
(3) 	 The right to weekly visits shall not apply to any child whose parent(s) have 
voluntarily consented to his/her adoption pursuant to G.L. c.21O, section 
2. 
(4) 	 The right to weekly visits shall not apply in any case in which the depart­
ment or provider has filed a petition to dispense with the need for parental 
consent to adoption pursuant to G.L. c.21O, section 3. In such a case, the 
department or provider shall petition the probate court to make an appro­
priate order regarding visits. 
Id. 
88. See Wald, JUpra note 41, at 676-80 for a discussion of a system for reuniting 
families. 
89. 	 In re Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 376 Mass. 252, 269, 381 N.E.2d 565, 574 (1978). 
But see Wald, JUpra note 41, at 692 n.269. 
Are we prepared to say that an endangered child should not be removed be­
cause the state has not provided services that might-have kept the family intact, 
when such services do not exist? Are we going to deny a child in foster care a 
permanent home because the state has not helped her parents regain custody, 
thereby consigning the child to impermanent foster care? 
Id. 
90. 	 See JUpra note 8. 
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breaking her tie to her foster parents, Brenda's rights to Shari will be 
terminated. This note takes the position that that would be the cor­
rect decision and would grant Shari her right to a permanent place­
ment with her psychological parents. It need not have been the 
inevitable decision. 
Shari was removed from her mother at birth because Brenda 
was incarcerated.91 It is possible for the legislature to change the 
current system, and preserve parent-child relationships by allowing 
children to remain with their mothers while the mother is incarcer­
ated.92 This would preserve the bond between a natural mother and 
her child. Furthermore, if the Department fully complied with its 
regulations by encouraging regular visitation93 when the parent and 
child must be separated, the impact of the temporary separation 
would be lessened.94 Parental rights would only need to be termi­
nated in extreme cases where it would not be possible to maintain an 
emotional bond between the parent and the child.95 
It is most likely too late to create a psychological parent rela­
tionship between Brenda and Shari. Shari should be accorded her 
right to a permanent home, a right that can clearly be implied from 
the standard.96 The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, however, 
should take the responsibility to gamer its resources and apply the 
tools at its disposal97 to protect the emotional tie between a natural 
mother and her child. 
Nancy B. Alisberg 
91. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text. 
92. Note, Mothers Behind Bars--A Look at the Parental Rights ofIncarcerated Wo­
men, 4 NEW ENG. 1. ON PRISON L. 141, 151 (1977). 
93. See supra note 87. 
94. Note, On Prisoners and Parenting: Preserving the Tie that Binds, 87 YALE L.l. 
1408, 1416 (1978). 
95. Id. at 1423. 
96. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
97. These tools include the policy to preserve the family, see supra note 8, the regu­
lations, see supra notes 82-87, and the case law reflecting the importance of family integ­
rity, see supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
